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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COMP ANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, a
division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff
and Cross Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
8950

MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, JEAN
DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, partners,
doing business under the firm name of
DAVIS OIL COMPANY,

Defendants
and Cross Respondents.

BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The cross appeal of Continental Emsco Company is from
the judgment of the trial court that items other than rock bits
furnished to the driller, such as chisels, pipe wrenches, punches,
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bolts, washers, putty
drivers, hatchets, etc.,
which the court found
well and therefor are

knives, sledge hammer handles, screw
and other items set out in the Exhibits
were not consumed in the drilling of the
not lienable. (TRB 114).

STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON
POINT I
MATERIALS FURNISHED TO A DRILLING CONTRACTOR IN THE NATURE OF REMOVABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER THE
UTAH STATUTES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MATERIALS FURNISHED TO A DRILLING CONTRACTOR IN THE NATURE OF REMOVABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER THE
UTAH STATUTES.
Cross Appellant Continental Emsco Company in its cross
appeal cites one case as authority for its position, namely,
William M. Graham Gas and Oil Co. v. Oil Well Supply Co.,
128 Okl. 201, 264 Pac. 591. This case clearly is not applicable
because the materials and supplies referred to therein were
furnished to the owner of the leasehold on a definite contract
for payment. In the case at bar, the materials for which a lien
is claimed were not sold to the owner of the leasehold but
were sold to the drilling contractor and the credit was extended
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to him. In the case of Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F2d
512, 5 Cir ., ( 1943), the court, in footnote No. 7, referred to
the William M. Graham Oil and Gas Co. case, supra., as
follows:
11

<

0klahoma seems to stand solitary and alone in
rejecting this view. William W. Graham Oil & Cas Co.
v. Oil U?. ell Supply Co., 128 Okl. 201, 264 P. 591,
overruling Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119
Okla. 77, 249 P. 717. It must be noted, however, that
in the Graham case, the liened materials were materials,
machinery and supplies normally used or consumed
in the drilling of a well, were furnished to the owner
on a definite contract for payment, and that that case
is not authority for the claim made here that a rig
sold to a contractor as a part of his plant is lienable
against the owner."

On page 20 of Cross Appellant's brief the applicable
Oklahoma statute is quoted verbatim. This statute is in nowise
comparable to the Utath statute. The Oklahoma statute provides that "any person, corporation or co-partnership, who,
shall, under contract express or implied, with the owner of
any leasehold for oil or gas purposes, or the owner of any
gas pipe line or oil pipe line or with the trustee or agent of
such owner, perform labor or furnish materials, machinery,
and oil well supplies used in the digging, drilling, torpedoing,
completing, operating or repair of any gas well, shall have a
lien upon the whole of such leasehold ... for which materialJ
and supplies were furnished." The Oklahoma statute includes
materials and supplies, whereas the Utah statute does not. In
the Utah statute the word materials is used, but the word
supplies does not appear. That the two words are not synonymous is clearly indicated in the following decisions: Willett
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v. Davis (Washington) 193 P2d 321, 329, where the court
said:
"We have always held that, within the purview of
Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 729, the rental of equipment is
neither labor performed nor materials furnished. Hall
v. Cowen, 51 Wash. 295, 98 Pac. 670; Hurley-Mason
Co. v. American Bonding Co., 79 Wash. 564, 140 Pac.
575. On the other hand, we are fully aware that
equipment rental is lienable as rsupplies' within the
purview of Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 1159 * * * ."

and the case of Clayton v. Bridgeport Machine Co., 33 SW2d
787, where the court stated:
"Another question presented is whether a lien is
given by the statute to secure the price or value of the
rental of drilling tools. * * * Were the lien given
only to secure labor and material, we would incline
to the view that it would not cover the rental of tools.
* * * The statute, however, also authorizes a lien to
secure payment of machinery and supplies so furnished and used. We will not stop to inquire if the
tools in question may properly be regarded as machinery. We think that tools such as these which are
customarily used in the drilling of oil or gas wells
under rental contract are supplies within the terms
of the statute.''
As to the lienability of the materials sold, we believe the
correct rule is stated in the case of Given v. Campbell, 127 Kan.
378, 273 Pac. 442:
"Now, it is perfectly obvious that if this well were
drilled to completion, these articles would not become
fixtures of the leasehold. They would constitute no
part of the improvement of the property. They will
be carried away and used on a second and third drilling
job, and so on until they are worn out. Should appellee's
6
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leasehold be subject to a lien for the payment of this
rope, belt, wrench, hammer, pail, sand line and drilling line? If so, will plaintiffs' leasehold alone be
subject to a lien therefore, or will all the leaseholds
in the community on which these chattels are successively used until they are worn out be likewise subjected to appellant's lien claim for their payment?
Why should a vendor's lien be granted on an interest
in reality for the price of a wrench, a hammer, or a
water pail purchased for the use of the driller of an
oil and gas well when no such lien was granted for
the purchase price of a carpenter's hammer, a plumber's
wrench, or a plasterer's water pail similarly used in
the construction of any other improvement in realty?

***"
To the same effect see Albuquerque Foundry & Machinery Works v. Stone (N.M.) 286 Pac. 157.
(All emphasis appearing herein has been added.)
Respectfully submitted,
ANTHONY F. ZARLENGO
CLINTON D. VERNON

Attorneys for Defendants
Cross Respondents
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